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Abstract 
 
The article begins by reconstructing the theory of uneven and combined development from 
Trotsky’s own writings in relation to Russia. It then looks more closely at the notion of the 
“modern” which in Trotsky’s account combines with the “archaic” or “backward,” before 
arguing that role of modernity suggests that uneven and combined development has been a far 
more widespread process than solely in the Third World/Global South. Drawing attention first 
to the English exception, the article then surveys examples from both West and East before 
concluding with an assessment of the relative durability of both permanent revolution and 
uneven development in the twenty-first century. 
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 Introduction 
 
In Part 1 of this article I traced the pre-history of the law of uneven and combined development 
through the emergence and extension of two historically prior concepts: the descriptive one of 
uneven development, from the early period of the European Enlightenment (although the term 
was only used from the late nineteenth century); and the strategic one of permanent revolution, 
from the upheavals of 1848–49. Both were deployed by the thinkers of the centre and left of 
the Second International from the beginning of the twentieth century, but not explicitly linked. 
It was Trotsky who was eventually to do so. Unlike all other variants of permanent revolution, 
his distinct and unique version held that the coming revolution in Russia had the potential to 
transcend the purely bourgeois nature which orthodoxy demanded, providing it could receive 
support from other successful revolutions in more developed capitalist nation-states. His 
prediction was eventually fulfilled in 1917, but it was only in the process of defending his 
initial thesis from attack by the emerging Stalinist bureaucracy that he finally provided an 
explicit theoretical basis for permanent revolution, and one which was generalizable beyond 
Russia: the “law” of uneven and combined development.  
The emergence of Trotsky’s version of permanent revolution has already been recounted in 
a number of works, including one by the present author, and I will not do so again here 
(Davidson 2012: 214–236, 284–308; Day and Guido 2009: 32–58; Knei-Paz 1978: 27–174; 
Larsson 1970: 256–304; Lowy 1981: 30–99). In Part 2 I will therefore first attempt to 
reconstruct the theory from Trotsky’s scattered writings on the subject, but then depart from 
the history of ideas and move instead onto the field of historical sociology proper, to assess the 
universality or otherwise of the process which the theory seeks to explain.  
On a handful of occasions Trotsky endorsed a transhistorical or transmodal interpretation of 
his theory, most famously in his last major work, The Revolution Betrayed, where he wrote, in 
passing: “The law of uneven development is supplemented throughout the whole course of 
history by the law of combined development” (Trotsky 1937: 300). However, this is 
incompatible with his earlier and more substantial discussion in The History of the Russian 
Revolution (1930), where he describes it as involving “a peculiar mixture of backward elements 
with the most modern” (Trotsky 1977: 27, 72). ‘Modern’ here is not a relative concept (as in 
the notion that every successive age has its own modernity), but denotes an epochal divide 
associated with the advent of capitalism. If the application of uneven and combined 
development is to be extended, it not backwards through time, but sideways through space: in 
other words, the process has been generated in virtually every society which has experienced 
capitalist modernity, rather than being confined to backward or underdeveloped areas. As we 
shall see, this also has implications for the strategy of permanent revolution since, if it is a 
universal aspect of capitalist modernity, then uneven and combined development can exist in 
situations where the former no longer feasible.  
It may be useful to begin the discussion by reminding ourselves of the famous passage from 
The History of the Russian Revolution where Trotsky introduced the concept:   
 
The privilege of historic backwardness—and such a privilege exists—permits, or rather compels, 
the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of 
intermediate stages. From the universal law of unevenness thus derives another law which for want 
of a better name, we may call the law of combined development—by which we mean a drawing 
together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic 
with more contemporary forms. (Trotsky 1977: 27–28)  
 
Alongside this passage, however, we also need to consider another by Trotsky, written shortly 
before his murder in 1940: “Only a minority of countries has fully gone through that systematic 
and logical development from handicraft through domestic manufacture to the factory, which 
Marx subjected to such detailed analysis (Trotsky 1940: 41). In fact, the minority consisted of 
only one country, England, although there were also a handful of territories within countries 
(the North-East of the USA, Catalonia before its incorporation into Spain) which had similar 
trajectories. The very shortness of the list does, however, support the argument I intend to 
make. For if the overwhelming majority of even the advanced capitalist states did not undergo 
the “systematic and logical development” to which Trotsky refers, then surely they too must 
have “skipped intermediate stages” and “drawn together the different stages of the journey”? 
Before turning to these issues, we need to explore Trotsky’s original argument in more detail.  
 
 
 The “Law” of Uneven and Combined Development 
 
Trotsky first formulated what he called the “law” of uneven and combined development in 
1930, in order to explain the conditions of possibility for the particular strategy of permanent 
revolution which he had first proposed twenty-five years earlier in relation to Russia. In this 
scenario, capitalist relations of production had been established and were perhaps even in the 
process of becoming dominant, but the bourgeois revolution had still to be accomplished. The 
existence of a militant working class, however, made the bourgeoisie unwilling to launch such 
a revolution on their own behalf for fear that it would get out of their control. The working 
class, on the other hand, could accomplish the revolution against the pre-capitalist state which 
the bourgeois itself was no longer prepared to undertake and—in Trotsky’s version of 
permanent revolution at any rate—move directly to the construction of socialism, providing of 
course that it occurred within the context of a successful international revolutionary 
movement: 
 
The irrevocable and irresistible going over of the masses from the most rudimentary tasks of 
political, agrarian and national emancipation and abolition of serfdom to the slogan of proletarian 
rulership, resulted…from the social structure of Russia and the conditions of the worldwide 
situation. The theory of Permanent Revolution only formulated the combined process of this 
development. (Trotsky 1977: 907) 
 
The societies which Trotsky originally identified as subject to uneven and combined 
development and to which he devoted most attention, were ruled by absolutist or tributary states 
which had been forced to partially modernise under pressure of military competition from the 
Western powers. As he noted, “the Great War, the result of the contradictions of world 
imperialism, drew into its maelstrom countries of different stages of development, but made 
the same claims on all the participants” (Trotsky 1972c: 249). Combined development in 
Russia was therefore generated by attempts on the part of the absolutist state to overcome the 
backwardness attendant on uneven development; but as Trotsky pointed out:  
 
Historical backwardness does not imply a simple reproduction of the development of advanced 
countries, England or France, with a delay of one, two, or three centuries. It engenders an entirely 
new “combined” social formation in which the latest conquests of capitalist technique and structure 
root themselves into relations of feudal or pre-feudal barbarism, transforming and subjecting them 
and creating peculiar relations of classes. (Trotsky 1976: 584).  
 
The former levels of stability typical of feudal or tributary societies are disrupted by the 
irruption of capitalist industrialisation and all that it brings in its wake: rapid population growth, 
uncoordinated urban expansion, dramatic ideological shifts. “When English or French capital, 
the historical coagulate of many centuries, appears in the steppes of the Donets Basin, it cannot 
release the same social forces, relations, and passions which once went into its own formation” 
(Trotsky 1972a: 68). Trotsky was particularly interested in the process by which these forms 
were fused, the result permeating every aspect of society, ideology as much as economy. The 
archaic and the modern, the settled and disruptive overlap and merge in all aspects of the social 
formations concerned, from the organisation of arms production to the structure of religious 
observance, in entirely new and unstable ways, generating socially explosive situations. It is 
tempting to describe these as mutations, except that the inadequacy of the language involved 
led Trotsky to reject the biological metaphors in which stages of development had been 
described from the Enlightenment through to the Third International in its Stalinist phase—and 
which is continued in the present-day notion of “hybridity”: “The absorptive and flexible 
psyche, as a necessary condition for historical progress, confers on the so-called social 
‘organisms,’ as distinguished from the real, that is, biological organisms, an exceptional 
variability of internal structure” (Trotsky 1972c: 251). Trotsky himself pointed to the existence 
of such forms in general terms in his notebooks on dialectics from the mid-1930s: 
 
Some objects (phenomena) are confined easily within boundaries according to some logical 
classification, others present [us with] difficulties: they can be put here or there, but within stricter 
relationship—nowhere. While provoking the indignation of systematisers, such transitional forms 
are exceptionally interesting to dialecticians, for they smash the limited boundaries of classification, 
revealing the real connections and consecutiveness of a living process. (Trotsky 1986: 77) 
 
The “uneven” aspect of uneven and combined development is demonstrated by the partial 
nature of its adoptions from the advanced countries: 
 
Russia was so far behind the other countries that she was compelled, at least in certain spheres, to 
outstrip them. … The absence of firmly established social forms and traditions makes the backward 
country—at least within certain limits—extremely hospitable to the last word in international 
technique and international thought. Backwardness does not, however, for this reason cease to be 
backwardness. (Trotsky 1977: 906; my italics)  
 
Within these spheres and limits, however, backward societies could however attain higher levels 
of development than in their established rivals: “At the same time that peasant land-cultivation 
as a whole remained, right up to the revolution, at the level of the seventeenth century, Russian 
industry in its technique and capitalist structure stood at the level of the advanced countries, 
and in certain respects even outstripped them” (Trotsky 1977: 30; my italics).  
These adoptions had, however, did not in themselves necessarily undermine the state, since: 
“The [backward] nation...not infrequently debases the achievements borrowed from outside in the 
process of adapting them to its own more primitive culture” (Trotsky 1977: 27). Indeed, initially 
at least, “debased adaptation” helped preserve the pre-capitalist state in Russia. From 1861 tsarism 
established factories using the manufacturing technology characteristic of monopoly capitalism in 
order to produce arms with which to defend feudal absolutism (Treblicock 1981: 281–284). The 
danger for the state lay in what these factories required in order to run, namely workers—and 
workers more skilled, more politically conscious than that faced by any previous absolutist or 
early capitalist state (Trotsky 1977: 55). Uneven and combined development in Russia created 
a working class which, although only a small minority of the population, was possessed of 
exceptional levels of revolutionary militancy. “Debased adaptation” was intended to preserve 
the existence of the undemocratic state; but to the extent that the former was successful it helped 
provoke the working class into destroying the latter.  
Thus, for Trotsky, the most important consequence of uneven and combined development 
was the enhanced capacity it potentially gave the working classes for political and industrial 
organisation, theoretical understanding, and revolutionary activity: “when the economic factors 
burst in a revolutionary manner, breaking up the old order; when development is no longer 
gradual and ‘organic’ but assumes the form of terrible convulsions and drastic changes of 
former conceptions, then it becomes easier for critical thought to find revolutionary expression, 
provided that the necessary theoretical prerequisites exist in the given country” (Trotsky 1972b: 
199). S. A. Smith describes the trajectory of one Russian worker who had his mind opened in 
this way to “critical thought”:  
 
For Kanatchikov, discovery of evolutionary theory came like a lightning bolt… His discovery of 
Darwin was soon complimented by his discovery of Marx: by 1902, aged 23, he had painfully 
mastered the first volume of Capital. This furnished him with a scientific understanding of 
society and the determination to dedicate himself to the cause of overthrowing capitalism. (Smith 
2008: 78) 
  
Kanatchikov exemplifies a general tendency identified by Tim McDaniel, namely that the 
militancy of Russian workers was “the product of leadership by a militant proletarian core of 
advanced workers employed in modern industry,” not of “disorientated workers of peasant 
origin and to young recruits into industry.” In his view, with which I agree, accounts “which 
emphasise the ‘spontaneity’ and unpredictability of worker militancy” end up “denying to it 
the coherence and ultimate rationality ascribed by Trotsky” (McDaniel 1991: 125). 
 Ankie Hoogvelt speaks for many commentators when she describes the process outlined by 
Trotsky in relation to Russia as leading to a “historically unique situation which is ripe for 
socialist revolution” (Hoogvelt 1997: 38). How “unique” was the situation though? Peter 
Thomas writes of one important case: “Italy, along with much of Western Europe, had 
experienced a ‘belated’ modernity not qualitatively dissimilar from that which preceded the 
Russian Revolution” (Thomas 2009: 202). Indeed, in the case of Italy—one of the established, 
imperial capitalist powers—these developments were occurring contemporaneously with those 
in Russia. How could a virtually universal socio-economic process lead to such different 
political outcomes? 
 Trotsky never claimed that all revolutionary situations were or would be the result of uneven 
and combined development: the working-class insurgencies which convulsed Britain in 1919, 
France in 1968 or Poland in 1980–81 do not require the concept in order to be understood. 
Second, even where revolutionary situations were made more likely by the existence of uneven 
and combined development, it is scarcely the only relevant factor; some decisive trigger event 
such as wartime defeat (Germany 1918), military coup (Spain 1936), external aggression 
(Hungary 1956), or economic crisis (Egypt 2011) is usually necessary to detonate the socially 
combustible material. Whether these situations develop into actual revolutions, and whether 
these revolutions are subsequently successful is partly dependent on subjective factors—such 
as the existence and quality of leadership—on both sides. Equally important, however, is the 
political context in which revolutionary situations arise; in particular, whether the state is pre-
capitalist or capitalist or in nature and, if the latter, whether or not the ruling class is capable of 
exercising hegemony. 
Between the victory of the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the defeat of the Chinese 
Revolution in 1927 Trotsky tended to treat the question of permanent revolution as an 
essentially historical one, relevant only to Russia, which he seems to have considered as sui 
generis, uniquely situated exactly half-way between West and East, as he explained in this 
speech from early in the 1920s: 
 
We Russians find ourselves—in terms both of sociology and geography—on the border-line 
between those countries which possess colonies and those which are themselves colonies. We are a 
colony in the sense that our largest factories in Petrograd, in Moscow and in the South were obtained 
by us ready-made from the hands of European and American finance capital which formerly drew 
off the profits. That a Russian industrial capitalist was merely a third-rate agent of world finance 
capitalism—this fact tended immediately to invest the struggle of the Russian worker with an 
international revolutionary character. Russian workers had before their eyes: on the one hand, the 
combined money-bags of Russia, France, Belgium, etc.; and on the other—the backward peasant 
masses, entangled in semi-feudal agricultural relations. At one and the same time we thus had in our 
country both London and India. This, despite all our backwardness, brought us flush up against 
European and world tasks in their most developed historical forms. (Trotsky 1973a: 176) 
 
Permanent revolution was unnecessary in the West where the bourgeois revolution had been 
accomplished and inapplicable in the East where the working class was not yet of sufficient 
size or militancy to move directly to the socialist revolution; in the East, Lenin’s original 
formula for Russia, the bourgeois-democratic—now rechristened “national-democratic”—
revolution was still relevant. Stalin’s disastrous adherence to this supposedly necessary stage 
of the revolution in China led Trotsky to generalise the strategy of permanent revolution 
beyond Russia, but also provoked him into formulating uneven and combined development as 
an explicit “law,” rather than an implicit but untheorized set of conditions which made 
permanent revolution possible. Thereafter, he tended to regard countries where some level of 
capitalist industrialisation had occurred, but which were still subject to pre-capitalist states of 
one sort or another, as subject to uneven and combined development and consequently as 
possible sites of permanent revolution. He did not, however, ever consider whether uneven and 
combined development might also exist in the West, except perhaps as a historical phenomenon 
long since surpassed; he wrote, for example, of the consequences “when the productive forces 
of the metropolis, of a country of classical capitalism...find ingress into more backward 
countries, like Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century” (Trotsky 1972b: 199).  In 
fact, the experience of uneven and combined development was nearly universal, but to 
understand why, we need to situate the process in the broader context of capitalist modernity.   
 
 
  Capitalist Modernity  
 
Modernity did not emerge with the capitalist mode of production in its original mercantile, 
financial or agrarian forms, but only with the beginnings of capitalist industrialisation and the 
related, but partially distinct process of urbanisation in Europe, North America and Japan. In 
other words, it is associated with a particular stage in capitalist development. The establishment 
of capitalism as a mode of production does not in and of itself immediately transform the lives 
of subaltern classes. There are two reasons for this. 
One concerns the labour process and is outlined by Marx in Capital vol. 1, in his discussion 
of the difference between the “formal” and “real” subsumption of labour. In the case of the 
former, rather than “a fundamental modification in the real nature of the labour process...the 
fact is that capital subsumes the labour process as it finds it, that is to say, it takes over an 
existing labour process, developed by a different and more archaic modes of production” 
(Marx 1976: 1021 and 1019–1038 more generally). In other words, the pre-existing ways of 
working can remain in place even during the initial phases of capitalist development. It may be 
possible for historians to retrospectively identify when the transition from feudalism was 
complete, but this does not mean that direct producers at the time understood that they had 
entered a new historical period.   
The other concerns outputs, and in particular the productive capacities of the first fully 
capitalist states compared with the great Eastern empires which had once been impossibly more 
wealthy and civilised than the poverty-stricken lands of European feudalism. The industrial 
world was in the West, but it only arose there relatively late, and certainly not the latest-
manifestation of Western superiority, claims for which would have for most of history produced 
mocking laughter from the East: even after the transition to capitalism the formerly backward 
Western European states, above all England, did not immediately catch-up and overtake those 
of the hitherto more advanced East. GDP in both areas was similar and, in the Chinese Empire 
at least, standards of living may have even been higher than in Western Europe and North 
America. It took until 1880 for per capita income there to reach double that of the East, and 
until the eve of the First World War for it to reach three times the size (Hobsbawm 1987: 15).  
In fact, it was the advent of industrial capitalism which initiated “the great divergence” 
between West and East, and the overwhelmingly uni-directional impact of the former on the 
latter. As Justin Rosenberg points out: “Imperial China sustained its developmental lead over 
several centuries; yet the radiation of its achievements never produced in Europe anything like 
the long, convulsive process of combined development which capitalist industrialization in 
Europe almost immediately initiated in China” (Rosenberg 2007: 44–45). For Ronald Hartwell, 
industrialisation is “the great discontinuity of modern history” (Hartwell 1971: 57). Indeed, if 
we accept the notion that we have entered into a new epoch of geological time known the 
Anthropocene, then the discontinuity is even greater than these writers could have imagined, 
with the Holocene—the 11,500-year era contiguous with human civilisation—being brought 
to an end as a result of industrialisation (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 3, 50–53).  
Yet it was not industrialisation alone which impacted on members of the new factory 
proletariat, but the fact that many of their new workplaces were situated in towns and cities. 
Indeed, as Jürgen Osterhammel notes, “urbanization was a much more widespread process than 
industrialisation: cities grew and became more dense even where industry was not the driving 
force.” After noting that many of the greatest European cities, including London, had never 
been truly industrial, but administrative and commercial, he concludes: “Urbanization is a truly 
global process, industrialization a sporadic and uneven formation of growth centres” 
(Osterhammel 2014: 149–50). Osterhammel’s point about London can be generalised to some 
other historic cities whose existence long predated capitalism, let alone industrialisation. “In a 
very important sense Vienna and Berlin were much more typically “modernist” cities, almost 
along the lines of American cities like Chicago, than were cities like London and Paris which 
underwent slower and more organic growth,” writes Scott Lash (1990: 207). But Vienna and 
Berlin were not equivalent either: of the two, Berlin was far closer to the American model—
although the latter too need to be differentiated: “If Vienna is not Berlin, neither is Boston 
Chicago” (Frisby 1985: 177 and 165–177 more generally). There is unevenness between the 
cities of capitalist modernity as well as combination within them. 
Even those cities which remained administrative and commercial rather than industrial 
centres were shaped by the requirements of industrialisation, not least the necessity for 
railways. Marshall Berman has identified “the unease and uncertainty that comes from constant 
motion, change, and diversity” with “the experience of modern capitalism” (1983: 19–20). At 
one level the size, noise and populousness of cities has often been bewildering for rural 
populations forced to cross their boundaries (although for some rustics they also provided a 
welcome relief from the narrowness and conformity of the countryside); but Berman is drawing 
attention to a qualitatively different situation, for the experience of urban life under industrial 
capitalism was distinct from any predecessor: “In comparison with the village or ‘pre-
modernist’ city, not just the sense of time but the experience of space was altered,” notes Lash 
(1990: 207). Beyond positive or negative experiences, life in the city was simply, vastly 
different from what inhabitants had previously known, creating new forms of consciousness 
based on experiences which were simply not available to an Italian country-dweller visiting 
first-century Rome, or, for that matter, an English one visiting sixteenth-century London. 
The impact of uneven and combined development in the West began some decades earlier 
than in Russia, but for the most part, and in most cases, such as that of Italy, the process 
chronologically overlapped with that in Russia. There is, of course, one major exception, to 
which I will turn first: England.  
 
 
English Exceptionalism 
 
England had completed the transition to capitalism by the late seventeenth century. It was not, 
of course, the only territory to have done so, as it was preceded by both the Italian city-states 
and the Netherlands (Arrighi 1994: 36–47). Capitalist relations of production were 
considerably more highly developed in England than in either of these, but England was also 
able to absorb their genuine innovations and those of states which failed to make the transition, 
then put them to more effective use than in their places of origin, a process for which the 
possession of an effective capitalist state apparatus was essential. As Marx noted in the chapter 
from Capital on “The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist”:  
 
The different moments of primitive accumulation can be ascertained in particular to Spain, Portugal, 
Holland, France and England, in more or less chronological order. These different moments are 
systematically combined together at the end of the seventeenth century in England; the combination 
embraces the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and the system of protection. (Marx 
1976: 915–916) 
 
This is not “combination” in Trotsky’s sense, however, as all the forms referred to by Marx are 
“contemporary.” The reason why capitalist modernity in England produced neither a social nor 
artistic revolutionary movement lies with the two unique conditions under which 
industrialisation and urbanisation took place.  
First, the capitalist state in England was consolidated at the completion of the bourgeois 
revolution in 1688, at a time when its economy was still dominated by agrarian, mercantile and 
financial capital. None of the other early capitalist states achieved this. The Italian city-states 
refused to unite and indeed were involved in ferocious competition with each other which left 
them exposed to conquest and enforced regression at the hands of local feudal lords and 
ultimately the Spanish Empire by the beginning of the sixteenth century. The United 
Netherlands, although formally a unified state even before the revolt against Spain in 1567, did 
not possess an integrated economy, but rather a highly fragmented one in which competition 
between cities and provinces was unimpeded. More importantly, in this context, the state itself 
remained resolutely decentralised and unable to pursue initiatives in the interest of Dutch 
capital as a whole, with power lying in regional governments which tended to be dominated by 
particular capitalist banking and mercantile interests (Davidson 2012: 563–564, 580–582). It 
was, as Perry Anderson points out, “a hybrid between a city-state and a nation-state” (Anderson 
2016: 92). As a result, industrialisation in both areas was largely postponed until nation-states 
were finally consolidated in the mid-nineteenth century. Industrialisation in England, however, 
arose within the context of a society where the state was already dedicated to the accumulation 
of capital, and that state had a far greater capacity for absorption and renovation under pressure 
than rival pre-capitalist states.  
Second, the internal pressures to which England was subject were in any case more 
containable than in later-developing states because of the extended timescale in which 
industrialisation took place. At least in part this was because it faced no real economic 
competition in capitalist terms until the latter third of the nineteenth century and was therefore 
not subject to the types of pressure to which all other subsequent developers, with the exception 
of the United States, were subject. As Sydney Pollard writes: “Unlike the experience of the 
following countries which were faced with a fairly comprehensive package of mutually 
reinforcing changes, the British [sic] evolution was slow, piecemeal and unconscious, in the 
sense of being unperceived as a whole” (Pollard 1996: 377). Consequently, notwithstanding 
the significance of industrialisation, even it did not have an immediately transformative impact 
on every aspect of social life. This is partly because the effects were cumulative and partly 
because, initially at least, industrialisation took place within a broader pre-existing non-
industrial context. The gradual, dispersed and unplanned nature of the process in England had 
implications for both the structure of the working class and the nature of the class struggle, 
both of which are in stark contrast to the forms these took later under actual conditions of 
uneven and combined development. Workplaces remained relatively small until very late in 
the nineteenth century, not least in London. As a result, trade union struggles were typically 
defensive of traditional or at least transitional forms of labour (Calhoun 1982: 60–84, 149–182; 
Zmolek 2013: 509–792). This was one of the reasons Trotsky identified for the greater 
implantation of Marxism among the working classes of Russia than in that of Britain. In the case 
of Russia itself: 
 
…the proletariat did not arise gradually through the ages, carrying with itself the burden of the past, 
as in England, but in leaps involving sharp changes of environment, ties, relations, and a sharp break 
with the past. It was just this—combined with the concentrated oppressions of czarism—that made 
Russian workers hospitable to the boldest conclusions of revolutionary thought—just as the 
backward industries were hospitable to the last word in capitalist organization. (Trotsky 1977: 33) 
 
Describing the situation prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917, Gareth Stedman Jones has 
contrasted “the revolutionary maturity of the Petrograd proletariat, uniquely concentrated in 
the most advanced factories of the capitalist world” with Britain, “the most advanced capitalist 
country,” where “the structure of the metropolitan working class still looked back to pre-
industrial divisions of skill and status”: “A few large plants were lost in an ocean of small 
workshops” (Stedman Jones 1984: 346). These conditions were conducive to the formation of 
Bolsheviks. Elsewhere in the West the effects of industrialisation and urbanisation would fall 
between the English and Russian extremes. 
 
 
Western Origins  
 
The most important new capitalist nation-states to follow Britain—the USA, Italy, Germany 
and Japan—unified (or re-unified) and consolidated themselves between 1848 and 1871. 
France achieved this slightly earlier—1830 is the French 1688, in the sense of concluding the 
era of its bourgeois revolution; but French industrialisation takes place essentially within the 
same time frame as these later developers. These involved transitions to capitalism which were, 
as Robert Looker and David Coates put it, “virtually contemporaneous” with industrialisation 
and urbanisation, rather than preceding them, as had been the case in England (Looker and 
Coates 1986: 112–113). The very existence of the British imperial state altered both the context 
for subsequent capitalist development and the pace with which it occurred. The latter was 
faster, partly because the long period of experiment and evolution characteristic of the Anglo-
Saxon pioneer could be dispensed with, but partly because of the urgency involved in acquiring 
the attributes of capitalist modernity in the face of military and economic competition from 
Britain. In very compressed timescales these emerging rivals adopted Britain’s socio-economic 
achievements to the extent that they became recognisably the same kind of societies, without 
necessarily reproducing every key characteristic—an impossible task anyway, given their very 
different histories and social structures. Harry Harootunian writes of Marx’s comments on 
German uneven development (in the “Preface to the First Edition” of Capital Volume 1) that 
he “was proposing that capitalist modernization is inevitably destined to produce the co-
presence of colliding temporalities, contemporary non-contemporaneities forcing people 
constantly to navigate their way through different temporal regimes as a condition of becoming 
modern” (Harootunian 2015: 62; Marx 1976: 91). The point is capable of being generalised 
beyond Germany: in fact, all of the second wave capitalist nation-states simultaneously faced 
in two directions, although usually inclining more towards one than the other.  
One direction was forward to conditions which would later emerge in Russia and to 
anticipations of permanent revolution. The increased tempo of development meant that the 
process of capitalist modernisation, and consequently the character of the class struggle, took 
respectively more intense and explosive forms—first of all in the country which was also 
geographically closest to England, and which since 1707 had been joined with it in the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain: Scotland. From the suppression of the last Jacobite attempt at 
counter-revolution in 1746 through to the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, Scottish society 
was marked by two processes, both in sharp contrast to the English experience: one was the 
extraordinary speed with which capitalist agriculture and the foundations of industrialisation 
was introduced in the Lowlands; the other was the concentrated effervescence of the 
Enlightenment, which was both a programme for agrarian transformation and a theorisation of 
the process. Even a society accelerating out of feudalism at this speed would however 
inevitably retain some of the characteristics of pre-existing conditions. One aspect of what 
Fredric Jameson calls “the co-existence of radically distinct zones of production and culture” 
is the Highland/Lowland divide (Jameson 1991: 405). This was not, however, the inert 
juxtaposition of two mutually sealed societies but their mutual interpenetration, first through 
the imposition of capitalist social relations on Highland land occupancy, then—a virtually 
inevitable consequence of this—the migration of now landless Highlanders into the 
industrialising Lowland towns and cities, above all to Glasgow. Migration was then and 
remains now one of the great catalysts for uneven and combined development. In this respect 
as in many others, Scotland was a forerunner for what was to follow more widely later, as 
external migration from Ireland was at least as significant as internal migration from the 
Highlands in providing the labour force for industrialisation. Although industrialisation took 
place more or less simultaneously in England and Scotland, the latter largely “skipped the 
intervening stages” between peasant self-sufficiency and wage labour which the former had 
experienced. “Scotland entered on the capitalist path later than England,” wrote Trotsky in 
1925, “a sharper turn in the life of the masses of the people gave rise to a sharper political 
reaction” (Trotsky 1974b: 37). By the early decades of the nineteenth century, the enormous 
tensions produced by industrialisation were heightened by the repressive weight of 
undemocratic state forms retained from the Union of 1707 until the Great Reform Act of 1832. 
These tensions and expressed themselves in moments of sharp class struggle, above all the 
unsuccessful 1820 general strike for male suffrage, first such action in history, involving 
around 60,000 workers—a substantial section of the global working class at the time—and two 
attempts at armed insurrection (Davidson 2000: 167–186). However, because Scotland did 
make the transition to the ranks of the advanced societies, albeit as a component part of another 
national formation, the revolutionary moment passed—not because the tensions of uneven and 
combined development had all been resolved, but because after 1832 a suitably adaptive state 
form had been extended to Scotland which was able to contain them. Uneven and combined 
development was resolved as uneven development, with Scotland as a whole “catching up and 
overtaking” England, within the overall British social formation.  
The other direction faced by the second wave nation-states was back to the English 
experience in the sense that they were able to accomplish the bourgeois revolution from 
above—1688 being the model rather than 1640 or 1649—and transform the state, albeit over a 
much more compressed period of time, in order to direct rapid industrialisation and contain the 
social tensions which it produced, often within the context of archaic socio-cultural forms. The 
process is perhaps best illustrated by the only Asian country to undertake this form of 
development in the closing decades of the nineteenth century after the bourgeois revolution 
from above known to history as the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Trotsky wrote in the 1930s, “we 
observe even today...correlation between the bourgeois character of the state and the semi-
feudal character of the ruling caste” (Trotsky 1976: 66). The former outweighed the latter. 
Mark Elvin argued that “Japan does not have to become identical to the present-day West to 
be ranked as comparably “modern” (Elvin 1986: 212). Indeed—but we should note the 
similarities between the British and Japanese states after 1868, to which Christopher Bayly has 
drawn attention. Between 1870 and 1914, both consciously emphasised the role of their 
monarch-emperors, the pre-existing symbolism of the crown being used to represent national 
unity against two main challenges: external imperial rivalry and internal class divisions (Bayly 
2004: 104).  Both were capitalist states that could be strongly contrasted with feudal absolutist 
Austria-Hungary or Russia, even down to the role of the emperor and empresses: “Russia 
represented the opposite pole to Japan within the spectrum of authoritarian monarchy—no 
corporate regime strategy, much depending on the monarch himself” (Mann 1988: 200). The 
state structure was crucial, as in many respects Japanese development was far more rapid than 
Russia’s, as Trotsky himself noted (Trotsky 1972e: 291). In effect, the post-Meiji Japanese 
state represented a way of containing the tensions created by uneven and combined 
development, even though these grew greater during and immediately after the First World 
War. If Japan is most extreme example of “contained” uneven and combined development, all 
the states which emerged at the same time display similar characteristics, to one degree or 
another. What factors made “containment” possible? 
Although capitalist states have greater repressive powers than their pre-capitalist 
forerunners or contemporaries, this is not, however, their only distinguishing characteristic. 
Equally important is their flexibility, which enables them to make gradual structural reforms 
in ways that pre-capitalist states, of the sort which existed in Trotsky’s lifetime and for several 
decades after his death, were not; the latter consequently had to be either overthrown by 
revolution, or destroyed in war. The same type of flexibility is also constitutive of 
contemporary capitalist states, even those in the Global South or former “East.” However 
backward they may be in many other respects, they have a far greater capacity for absorption 
and renovation under pressure. Jeff Goodwin’s “state-centred” approach identifies a number of 
“practices” or “characteristics” which can make the emergence of revolutionary movements or 
situations less likely. The most relevant to our discussion is “political inclusion,” which: 
 
…discourages the sense that the state is unreformable or an instrument of a narrow class or clique 
and, accordingly, needs to be fundamentally overhauled. … Accordingly, neither liberal populist 
polities nor authoritarian yet inclusionary (for example) “populist” regimes have generally been 
challenged by powerful revolutionary movements. (Goodwin 2001: 44, 46–47) 
 
If the states in question need not be “democratic,” then representative institutions in and of 
themselves are not necessarily the reason for their apparent imperviousness to overthrow. In 
fact, if we take bourgeois democracy to involve, at a minimum, a representative government 
elected by the adult population, where votes have equal weight and can be exercised without 
intimidation by the state, then it is a relatively recent development in the history of capitalism 
(Therborn 1977: 4, 17). Indeed, in the context of his discussion of modernity, Anderson noted 
that down to the close of the Second World War: “In no European state was bourgeois 
democracy completed as a form, or the labour movement integrated or co-opted as a force” 
(Anderson 1984: 105). Far from being intrinsic to bourgeois society, representative democracy 
has largely been introduced by pressure from the working class and extended by pressure from 
the oppressed. The authors of an important study of the relationship between capitalism and 
democracy are therefore right to reject any automatic correspondence between the two:  
 
It was not the capitalist market nor capitalists as the new dominant force, but the contradictions of 
capitalism that advanced the cause of democracy. … The relationship between working-class 
strength and democracy may be summarised in the following way: a diachronic analysis within 
each of the Western European countries reveals that the growth of working-class organizational 
strength led to increased pressure for the introduction of democracy; a synchronic analysis reveals 
that these pressures led to the development of stable democratic regimes where the working class 
found allies in other social groups. (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992: 7, 142–143) 
 
It is true that that mass suffrage has not proved as dangerous to capitalism as the bourgeoisie 
initially feared it would; but recognizing this does not involve accepting the much more sweeping 
claim that it is the main source of popular legitimacy for the capitalist state. Most capitalist states 
in the West and the system over which they presided were afforded legitimacy by their working 
classes before the vote was extended to them. In the case of Britain, the Representation of the 
People Act which finally introduced suffrage for all men and women over the age of 21 was 
only passed in 1928.  
 The key factor in securing the adherence of the subaltern is surely not democracy, but the 
concept most closely associated with Gramsci, hegemony, which may include democratic 
institutions, but not necessarily so. Above all, it is not exercised solely through the state, as 
Peter Thomas explains: 
 
A class’s hegemonic apparatus is the wide-ranging series of articulated institutions (understood in 
the broadest sense) and practices—from newspapers to educational organisations to political 
parties—by means of which a class and its allies engage their opponents in a struggle for political 
power. This concept traverses the boundaries of the so-called public (pertaining to the state) and the 
private (civil society), to include all initiatives by which a class concretizes its hegemonic project in 
an integral sense. (Thomas 2009: 226) 
 
Hegemony need not be wholehearted endorsement of capitalism, but rather a sense of the 
impossibility of change. In this context all that capitalism requires to do is maintain a majority 
of the working class in circumstances which are bearable compared to the imaginable 
alternatives, while those for whom it is not bearable fail to understand why this is so and 
consequently are no position to alter their situation (Crehan 2016: 60; Lester 2000: 72). One 
reason why an irreplaceable component of capitalist hegemony is nationalism, both as a source 
of psychic compensation and means of political mobilisation, is to prevent the most oppressed 
and exploited from acquiring this understanding (Davidson 2000: 24–46).  
The social and cultural experiences produced by uneven and combined development were 
similar across East and West, albeit to different degrees, but the class adversary and 
consequently the nature of the state was quite different. Ranajit Guha once described colonial 
India as a situation involving “dominance without hegemony,” but this could be found 
throughout the East (Guha 1997).  In a sense, it is where uneven and combined development is 
present but hegemony is absent that the conditions for permanent revolution arose.  To 
conclude: there is no necessary connection between uneven and combined development and 
permanent revolution, as the former existed throughout much of the West, outside of North-
Western Europe, even into the era of the Russian Revolution.   
But equally, what Trotsky called “debased adaptation” is not only a feature of backward 
societies seeking to preserve themselves with the help of therapeutic inoculations of capitalist 
modernity. Trotsky saw it as a much more general phenomenon, necessarily caused by the need 
to maintain bourgeois hegemony over the exploited and oppressed in an era of revolution and 
which reached its apogee in the United States. In an address to the First All-Union Society of 
Friends of Radio in 1926 he warned of the counterrevolutionary possibilities of the 
technological form his listeners had come to celebrate:  
 
It is considered unquestionable that technology and science undermine superstition. But the class 
character of society sets substantial limits here too. Take America. There, church sermons are 
broadcast by radio, which means that the radio is serving as a means of spreading prejudices. 
(Trotsky 1973b: 257) 
 
Once the notion of combined development was available to him, Trotsky saw this 
appropriation of advanced technology as the obverse of the ideological advances made by 
Russian and Chinese workers. “In America we have another kind of combined development. 
We have the most advanced industrial development together with the most backward—for all 
classes—ideology” (Trotsky 1972d: 117). In a striking passage in an essay of 1933 considering 
the nature of National Socialism, Trotsky commented on the persistence of archaic or at least 
pre-modern ideas, not only in Nazi Germany but also more generally across the developed 
world: 
 
Today, not only in peasant homes but also in city skyscrapers, there lives alongside of the twentieth 
century the tenth or the thirteenth. A hundred million people use electricity and still believe in the 
magic power of signs and exorcisms. The Pope of Rome broadcasts over the radio about the 
miraculous transformation of water into wine. Movie stars go to mediums. Aviators who pilot 
miraculous mechanisms created by man’s genius wear amulets on their sweaters. What inexhaustible 
reserves they possess of darkness, ignorance and savagery! (Trotsky 1975: 413) 
 
These are obviously not merely historical observations. The political implications of this 
have become apparent at several points in US history, most recently in the religious element 
within the Tea Party and in (highly regionalised) support for Donald Trump which 
nevertheless—due to the vagaries of the US Electoral College—delivered him victory in the 
2016 Presidential elections. The dominance of religion in public life is not, however, the key 
element of “debased adaptation” in a US context. For there is a sense in which, more than 
Germany and Japan, more even than the UK, the US has sustained a pre-capitalist inheritance 
from its emergence as an independent state which persists to this day: the Constitution. In 
Bloch’s words this is not only “not dangerous to capitalism,” but positively beneficial for it. 
Daniel Lazare is exaggerating only slightly to describe the USA as “an eighteenth-century 
republic that has come to resemble a democracy in certain respects, but which at its core 
remains stubbornly anti-democratic”: “While the United States might look like a democracy 
and sometimes even act like one, it was fundamentally a holdover from the days when not even 
the most radical politicians believed that the people should be free to run the government as a 
whole” (Lazare 2001: 9).  This continuing element of archaism at the heart of the most-self-
consciously “modern” of societies should caution against claims that that there are no longer 
any forms pre-dating capitalist modernity with which it can combine, even in the West. 
 
 
Eastern Variations 
 
By 1938 Trotsky was to describe permanent revolution as “the general trend of revolutionary 
development in all backward countries” (Trotsky 1973d: 138). We should not take these 
comments too literally. Trotsky was perfectly aware that what he called “the hierarchy of 
backwardness” involved enormously varied levels of development across the colonial and 
semi-colonial world (Trotsky 1976: 582). As a result, the size of the working class and its 
ability to influence events was also subject to massive differentiation. Trotsky accepted that a 
certain degree of social weight was necessary on the part of any working class before it could 
aspire to taking power; what was possible in India and China would not necessarily be possible 
in equatorial Africa or Afghanistan. Where the working class existed it was always necessary 
to establish organisational and political independence, but: “The relative weight of the 
individual and transitional demands in the proletariat’s struggle, their mutual ties and their 
order of presentation, is determined by the peculiarities and specific conditions of each 
backward country and—to a considerable extent—by the degree of its backwardness” (Trotsky 
1973d: 138). Not every backward country experienced uneven and combined development, 
although ironically, those that had not tended to be those that had escaped colonisation like 
Ethiopia. From the late 1920s Trotsky began to identify those countries other than Russia where 
uneven and combined development had created the possibility of permanent revolution. There 
were two main types, neither of which resembled the Tsarist feudal-absolutist regime.  
  One was exemplified by China and the post-Ottoman Arab Middle East after the First 
World War—formerly analogous state forms now past the point of collapse and disintegrating 
under Franco-British imperialist pressure. Here it is the absence of any centralised state which 
forms the context. Instead of being directly colonised, these newly fragmented territories saw 
agents of foreign capital establish areas of industrialisation under the protection of either their 
own governments or local warlords, both of which presented the same blocks to overall 
development. The result in relation to China was made by one of Trotsky’s then-followers, 
Harold Isaacs:  
 
The pattern of Chinese life is jagged, torn, and irregular. Modern forms of production, transport and 
finance are superimposed upon and only partially woven into the worn and threadbare pattern of the 
past. (Isaacs 1961: 1)  
 
As this suggests, even where industrialisation and urbanisation did occur, uneven and 
combined development did not necessarily follow, as sometimes the archaic and modern may 
be too distant from each other to fuse. Smith quotes an assessment of conditions in Beijing in 
1918 by a founding member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Li Dazhao, in which he 
describes how “the gap in time between old and new is too big, that the spatial juxtaposition is 
too close”: 
 
Wheels and hooves move side by side, sirens hoot, there is the sound of cars and horses, of rickshaw 
pullers spitting and cursing each other. There is diversity and confusion, complexity to an extreme 
degree. … The new resents the obstacles posed by the old. The old resents the dangers posed by the 
new. (quoted in Smith 2008: 18) 
 
It was Shanghai, rather than Beijing, where the different temporalities fused to such an 
extent such that the city became both a centre of capitalist modernity and of the opposition to 
it, serving as the venue for the launch of the CCP: “Shanghai thus served as a polyvalent 
symbol; an emblem of consumer affluence and of class exploitation, of foreign imperialism 
and patriotic resistance, of individualism and mass society” (Smith 2008: 18). Combined 
development was experienced throughout the entire texture of urban life where capitalism took 
hold. Shanghai was in the vanguard in terms of both production and consumption. The city had 
textile mills before anywhere in the Southern states of the USA and by 1930 was home to the 
largest mill in the world; the first cinema in Shanghai opened only five years after the first large 
cinema opened in San Francisco (Pye 1981: xv). 
The most dramatic changes affected the working class. After 1918, workers were mainly 
former peasants or rural labourers, who were now subject to the very different and 
unaccustomed rhythms of industrial urban life without intervening stages. Jean Chesneaux 
writes that the main characteristics of the Chinese proletariat were “its youth, its instability, its 
swollen lower ranks and its lack of a developed labour elite” (Chesneaux 1968: 50). In this 
respect the Chinese working class closely resembled its Russian forerunner, not least in the 
openness to Marxism which these conditions tended to produce: “The fact that the students and 
workers...are eagerly assimilating the doctrine of materialism,” wrote Trotsky, “while the 
labour leaders of civilized England believe in the magic potency of churchly incantations, 
proves beyond a doubt that in certain spheres China has outstripped England.” In these cases 
ideology outstrips economy, for “the contempt of the Chinese workers for the mediaeval dull-
wittedness of [Ramsay] MacDonald does not permit the inference that in her general economic 
development China is higher than Great Britain” (Trotsky 1977: 1220).  
The other type of society identified by Trotsky as experiencing uneven and combined 
development were among the actual colonies, although not every colony did so. “Commercial, 
industrial and financial capital invaded backward countries from the outside,” he wrote, “partly 
destroying the primitive forms of native economy and partly subjecting them to the world-wide 
industrial and banking system of the West” (Trotsky 1940: 41). What Peter Curtin calls 
“defensive modernization” was not enough to protect these societies from Western incursions. 
In the case of the Merinian monarchs of Madagascar, for example: “They not only failed to 
modernize beyond adopting Christianity and superficial European fashions, they failed to build 
a kind of society and government administration that would perpetuate their own power” 
(Curtin 2000: 150). Once the race for imperial territory began in earnest during the closing 
decades of the nineteenth century, it became strategically necessary for the Western powers to 
seize territories which were often of no value in themselves—indeed, which were often net 
recipients of state expenditure—but which it was necessary to retain in order to protect those 
territories which were of economic value, like India (Hobsbawm 1987: 67–69). Colonial rule 
could of course throw societies backward, as in the case of British-occupied Iraq. Ruling 
through the Hashemite monarchy after 1920, the regime deliberately rejected any attempts at 
modernisation, except in the oil industry. Instead, it reinforced disintegrating tribal loyalties 
and semi-feudal tenurial relationships over the peasantry. Peter Gowan describes the British 
initiatives as “the creation of new foundational institutions of landownership in order to revive 
dying traditional authority relations, resulting in economically and socially regressive 
consequences, undertaken for thoroughly modern imperialist political purposes—namely, to 
create a ruling class dependent upon British military power and therefore committed to imperial 
interests in the region” (Gowan 1999: 167). Nevertheless, even in this type of colonial context, 
some industrialisation took place. The British in India, for example, were unwilling to allow 
full-scale industrialisation in case it produced competition for its own commodities, but was 
prepared to sanction it in specific circumstances for reasons of military supply or where goods 
were not intended for home markets—a form of “licenced industrialisation,” particularly in 
textiles (Bayly 2004: 182; Osterhammel 2014: 663). This could not lead to general economic 
development, it is true, but as Osterhammel writes, “even at the end of the nineteenth century, 
the socially and economically ‘backward’ regions of Europe were certainly not ahead of the 
more dynamic ones of India or China” (Osterhammel 2014: 664). 
As in the case of absolutist states like Russia, there were examples among the fragmented 
former empires and the outright colonies of how it was possible to pull ahead in particular areas 
or industries of all but the most developed areas of the West. Here too the outcomes were not 
always straightforwardly revolutionary, but leaving aside complete rejection of capitalist 
modernity, there were three possible responses to it, all of which I illustrate here with examples 
from the history of modern Islam.  
One was renewal, where capitalist modernity led to existing cultural practices being 
maintained in new ways which were then assimilated to tradition. Hobsbawm has written of 
“the invention of tradition” that “we should expect it to occur more frequently when a rapid 
transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which “old” traditions had 
been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or when such old 
traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators prove no longer sufficiently 
adaptable and flexible or are otherwise eliminated” (Hobsbawm 1983: 4–5). Here is one, highly 
pertinent example of this process from the late nineteenth century: 
 
In the Muslim world, the Islamic burkah, the full body covering of Muslim women, was growing in 
popularity. Often wrongly regarded as a mark of medieval obscurantism, the burkah was actually a 
modern dress that allowed women to come out of the seclusion of their homes and participate to a 
limited degree in public and commercial affairs. Even in this insistence on tradition, therefore, one 
glimpses the mark of growing global convergence. (Bayly 2004: 15)  
 
Indeed, as even one of the arch-defenders of the “clash of civilizations” thesis points out of 
another innovation: “The office of ayatollah is a creation of the nineteenth century; the rule of 
Khomeini and of his successor as “supreme Jurist,” an innovation of the twentieth” (Lewis 
2002: 127). 
These examples illustrate one extreme. At the other we find adoption, a similar embrace of 
modernity—or at least one version of it—and rejection of tradition that we have already 
encountered in Russia and China, here in 1940s Iraq: 
 
The impact of the [Marxist] theory, particularly on minds that lived on ancient ideas–ideas that 
assumed that poverty and wealth were something fated, unalterable features of life–can be imagined. 
An Iraqi of a religious family, who had been brought up according to the traditional Shī‘ī precepts 
and became a member of the Politbureau of the Communist party in the forties, recalled in a 
conversation with this writer how when reading a forbidden book he first came across the idea that 
distinctions between men were not God-given but were due to human and historical causes, the idea 
was to him “something like a revelation.” There was nothing in his previous experience to suggest 
anything different. He had taken for granted the Qur’ānic injunction: “And as to the means of 
livelihood we have preferred some of you to others” (Batatu 1978: 481). 
 
A third response lies between these extremes, all the more interesting because it can be seen 
as a potential bridge from one to the other—adaptation, where “contemporary” forms of class 
struggle were deployed in order to defend “archaic” forms of religious observance, as occurred 
around the jute weaving industry in Bengal during the 1890s. During this period the Scottish 
mill managers both introduced night working and attempted to prevent workers—many of 
whom had only recently arrived from the countryside—from attending religious festivals, to 
which the mainly, but by no means exclusively Muslim weavers responded by rioting and 
striking. Anthony Cox writes of their motivations: “In part, this growing militancy was 
encouraged, if not fostered, by notions of fairness and honour held by Indian workers.” In 
particular, they held to notions of customary rights (Dasturi), fairness (Instaf) and social honour 
(Izzat). Much the same spurs to action can be found in the great strike wave of 1920–22 in 
which individual disputes were often responses to assaults by supervisors on children or women 
(Cox 2014: 57, 119). 
 
 
The Persistence of Uneven and Combined Development  
 
Can we still discern the process of uneven and combined development in contemporary 
capitalism? A common theme on the left since the late 1980s in particular, more or less 
coincident with the consolidation of neoliberalism, has been what they tend to call the 
elimination of the non-synchronous or, in terms of this article, the evening-out of unevenness 
and the stabilisation of combination. Guy Debord, reflecting in 1998 on his twentieth 
anniversary of his critique of the Spectacular Society, argued that it now had reached a point of 
total integration in which where all forms predating capitalist modernity had been absorbed and 
rendered affectless: “Beyond a legacy of old books and old buildings, still of some significance 
but destined to continual reduction and, moreover, increasingly highlighted and classified to 
suit the spectacle’s requirements, there remains nothing, in culture or nature, which has not been 
transformed, and polluted, according to the means and interests of modern industry” (Debord 
1998: 10). More recently, although rather less comprehensibly, Harmut Rosa, one of the main 
proponents of “accelerationalism” has argued:  
 
The ubiquitous simultaneity of late modernity…is thus, strictly speaking, no longer a simultaneity 
of the nonsimultaneous, since that presupposes the idea of a temporalized, directed, and moving 
(though asynchronous) history. Instead, it is, as it were, a static, situational, “timeless,” and orderless 
simultaneity of historical fragments. (Rosa 2014: 292–293)  
 
It is the theorists of postmodernism, however, how have been most insistent in claiming that 
the contradictions of capitalist modernity have been overcome. Jameson, perhaps the most 
influential of these figures, claims that everything associated with “pre-modernity” had “finally 
been swept away without a trace”:    
 
Everything is now organized and planned; nature has been triumphantly blotted out, along with 
peasants, petit-bourgeois commerce, handicraft, feudal aristocracies and imperial bureaucracies. 
Ours is a more homogeneously modernized condition: we no longer are encumbered with the 
embarrassment of non-simultaneities and non-synchronicities. Everything has reached the same hour 
on the great clock of development or rationalization (at least from the perspective of “the West”). 
(Jameson 1991: 309–310) 
 
As is quite often the case with Jameson, it is unclear whether the quoted passage expresses his 
own view or is simply intended to reflect a widely-held belief, which it certainly does: but in 
either case, does the belief correspond to reality?  
One response to such claims might be to argue that uneven and combined development still 
persists, but that the mechanisms by which it produces its effects is no longer the same as in 
Trotsky’s lifetime, precisely because there are no longer any pre-capitalist survivals with which 
capitalist modernity can combine. “Today,” writes Joseph Choonara, “uneven and combined 
development is best conceived as a drawing together of successive phases—including, 
crucially, capitalist phases—in novel forms within countries of the Global South” (Choonara 
2011: 182). Choonara stands in the Trotskyist tradition, but similar positions have been taken 
by writers outside it (see, for example, Pieterse 2000: 129–137). In fact, although uneven and 
combined development can involve what used to be called “the articulation of modes of 
production”—and actually did so in, for example, pre-revolutionary Russia and pre-
Independence India, it need not. Trotsky himself certainly thought that uneven and combined 
development was possible in societies where capitalist laws of motion were already dominant, 
as he thought they were in China by the late 1920s (Trotsky 1974a: 162). Regardless of 
intellectual pedigree, however, it is true that the combination of different phases of capitalist 
development can produce entirely new social consequences. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
discovers such a process in Latin America, in passages which echo Trotsky’s remarks about 
the effect of English or French capital being transplanted onto the steppes of the Donets Basin. 
“From the perspective of stages of development,” they write, “one might think that through the 
contemporary export of industrial production, an auto factory built by Ford in Brazil in the 
1990s might be comparable to a Ford factory in Detroit in the 1930s because both instances of 
production belong to the same industrial stage.” According to these authors such a thought 
would however be mistaken:  
 
…the two factories are radically different in terms of technology and productive passages. When 
fixed capital is exported, it is exported generally at its highest level of productivity. The Ford factory 
in 1990s Brazil, then, would not be built with the technology of the Ford factory of 1930s Detroit, 
but would be based on the most advanced productive computer and information technologies 
available. The technological infrastructure of the factory would locate it squarely within the 
information economy. (Hardt and Negri 2000: 287) 
 
But does uneven and combined development today only involve the transplantation of the 
newest technologies into those areas which had never experienced the older versions, or does 
it still involve the impact of capitalist modernisation on peasants and rural dwellers? The latter 
scenario does rather depend on the continued existence of a peasant class to be impacted upon, 
which several leading Marxists thinkers have suggested is no longer the case. In the final 
volume of his history of the “short” twentieth century, for example, Hobsbawm identified the 
most significant social change to have taken place in its second half, the one which broke 
decisively with the entire previous history of humanity, as “the death of the peasantry” 
(Hobsbawm 1994: 289, 415). But if peasants are still “flooding” out of villages—as Hobsbawm 
acknowledged they were—then this implies that reports of their death as a class have been 
greatly exaggerated. As might be expected from his previously quoted comments, Jameson 
sees the supposedly disappearing peasantry as an important aspect of how everything which 
pre-existed capitalist modernity is being obliterated, and is particularly concerned with the 
effect on our sensibilities: 
 
…when the premodern vanishes, when the peasantry shrinks to a picturesque remnant, when suburbs 
replace the villages and modernity reigns triumphant and homogenous over all space, then the very 
sense of an alternative temporality disappears as well, and postmodern generations are dispossessed 
(without ever knowing it) of any differential sense of that deep time the first moderns sought to 
inscribe in their writing. (Jameson, 2003: 699) 
 
There is a degree of telescoping involved in both accounts. The decline of the peasantry as 
a proportion of the global population is undeniable, though it has been slower and more varied 
than expected—indeed, it is possible that peasants still constitute the largest global class 
(Harman 2009: 47). The majority of the world industrial working class—79 per cent in 2010—
are now based in the Global South, but this does not mean that the majority of people there are 
industrial workers; by 2010 only 23.1 per cent were (Smith 2016: 101–104). In this respect, 
proletarianisation in the Global South presents a paradoxical picture and one which does not 
simply repeat earlier patterns: 
 
The historical pattern of capitalist industrialisation in the West and Japan was accompanied by the 
kind of industrialisation and employment generation there that led to the decline of the rural 
population to the point that it constitutes, at most between 2 and 8 per cent of the overall population 
in the advanced countries. For countries like Brazil, India, China and Mexico the rural population is 
currently a majority. In due course it may well become a minority, but well above the proportions 
now prevailing in the earlier industrialising countries. (Vanaik 2014: 8) 
Furthermore, while proletarianisation is an ongoing process it is not always simply a case 
of abandoning the farm and entering the factory in a once-and-for-all break. The move from 
peasant to worker involves people retaining links, moving back and forth between rural and 
urban areas, with a correspondingly complex development of class consciousness. The process 
is also spatially uneven: in some regions the “new enclosures” and other processes associated 
with the emergence of the neo-liberal trade and food regimes push small and middling peasants 
and their offspring off the land and into the cities (though not necessarily into factory work), 
while in others a degree of “re-peasantisation” in the form of partial reliance on small-holdings 
for subsistence/income by urban workers still continues in the formal and informal sectors 
(Bernstein 2001: 38–40). In the early 1980s Neil Smith wrote of how: “Pre-capitalist modes of 
production had been integrated into the world capitalist system as ‘internalized externals’. As 
such they have not made the complete transition from formal to real integration, and the real 
integration of the global space-economy is necessarily incomplete” (Smith 2010: 188–189). 
These types of complexities in the capital/labour relation, rather than smooth transitions from 
formal to real subsumption, or straight binary oppositions between capital and labour are of 
course exactly what uneven and combined development would lead us to expect.  
China was the first country outside of Russia for which Trotsky argued that a strategy of 
permanent revolution was possible. As in the Russian case, this was because the process of 
uneven and combined development had produced—among other things—a working class 
which was small relative to the overall population, but possessed of an exceptional degree of 
revolutionary militancy. Even the dramatic changes which occurred in China during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century have, however, been overshadowed by the contemporary 
impact of uneven and combined development, which resumed late in 1978, when the party-
state began to reinsert China into the world economy, and which is currently experiencing 
uneven and combined development in its most intense form. Mike Davis is surely correct to 
say: “Two hundred million Chinese factory workers, miners and construction labourers are the 
most dangerous class in the planet” (Davis 2011: 15). What the outcome also suggests, 
however, is that the state has developed the adaptability to absorb or “contain” the effects of 
uneven and combined development, just as earlier capitalist states had done. Ironically—given 
the persistence of Western leftist fantasies about the socialist nature of the regime—one reason 
for this ability is that it continues to perform what has historically been one of the main 
functions of the capitalist state, but one which has been weakened in the West by both decades 
of neoliberalism and more recently by experiments in right-wing populism: representing and 
managing the interests of national capital as a whole. Walker and Buck note how neoliberal 
developments since 1978 (or “the transition” as they describe it) “has reconfigured the form of 
the state in a way that has unleashed the powers of capitalism.” One aspect of this has been the 
devolution of power to the metropolitan and prefectural levels, giving local governments the 
ability to annex territory and existing urban areas, and to raise revenue through local taxes and 
rents. The authors entirely correct view that China “has followed a path not so distant from 
those of Europe and North America” leaves Walker and Buck with “a final question” which is 
why China’s polity has not liberalised in line with the neoliberalisation of its economy (Walker 
and Buck 2007: 65). The obvious answer is, as I have already suggested, that there is no 
necessary connection between capitalism—certainly not the neoliberal variant—and 
democracy. In China what David Goodman calls the “intermediate middle classes” are not yet 
demanding reform, let alone overthrow of the state: “On the contrary…[they] are fundamental 
supporters of the contemporary Party-state, even if at times some are also the most articulate 
critics of specific actions and policy settings of the Party-state, particularly wanting it to be 
more efficient and just” (Goodman 2014: 155). If an insurgent working class is one central 
problem facing the Chinese party-state then the other is precisely whether the devolution of 
power to individual capitalists and bureaucrats has begun to undermine its ability to perform 
its role as central authority for the system as a whole. 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
At the time of Trotsky’s murder in 1940, the viability of the strategy of permanent revolution 
in any particular state depended on the existence of two factors. One was that the bourgeois 
revolution had not yet been accomplished and would have to be achieved, then superseded, by 
the working class leading an alliance of the exploited and oppressed. In this context, “bourgeois 
revolution” primarily means the destruction of pre-capitalist states, be they absolutist, tributary, 
colonial or some combination of these forms. The other factor was uneven and combined 
development, the rapid intrusion of industrialisation and urbanisation into hitherto mainly 
agrarian societies, the galvanic impact of which drove working classes, although a minority of 
the population, into the type of revolutionary action uncommon in the more stable, wealthier 
states at the core of the capitalist system. The two are connected, not only by the agency of the 
working class, but by the nature of the states against which permanent revolution could be 
waged. Precisely because they were not capitalist nation-states, they lacked the flexibility and 
adaptability to accommodate worker insurgencies through reform or concessions, and relied on 
repression, which tended to intensify revolutionary pressures. What is the situation today? 
On the one hand, the last remaining bourgeois revolutions were all achieved decades ago, 
with in the final stages of decolonisation, and in most cases the working class played a marginal 
role, for reasons for that fall beyond the scope of this article (but see Cliff 2003 and Davidson 
2015, xviii–xxi, 203–216, 29–231). The key point is that nowhere are there any longer “pre-
capitalist” stages to be overtaken. It is possible of course, to substitute the absence of 
democracy as a stimulus to permanent revolution as Trotsky himself sometimes did, for 
example in relation to Spain (1973c: 307). Under capitalist conditions, however, while the 
simple absence of democracy, or even its restriction, can and has provoked resistance, it is quite 
different from the immovable obstacle presented by the pre-capitalist state. Above all, 
democracy can and has been granted, resulting not in an escalation to socialist revolution, but 
demobilisation. Consequently, permanent revolution has to be considered as a strategy which 
was potentially possible of achievement down to the last quarter of the twentieth century, but 
is now a purely historical category, since one of its conditions of possibility no longer exists.  
On the other hand, uneven and combined development has, if anything, intensified since the 
mid-1970s, not least because of the shift in manufacturing from the metropolitan centres of 
capitalism to the global south, above all in China. In these cases it is not the fusion of pre-
capitalist and capitalist modes of production which is producing the socially explosive 
situations identified by Trotsky nearly a hundred years ago, but the experience of peasants 
thrown into industrialising—and often newly-created—cities of the Pearl Delta. The 
extraordinary levels of day-to-day worker resistance to their conditions suggests that the effect 
of uneven and combined development has not changed in the intervening period. 
We are therefore left with a paradox: Trotsky theorised uneven and combined development 
as an explanation for the possibility of permanent revolution. Yet his theory, and the social 
reality that it seeks to comprehend, has outlasted the viability of the strategy it was intended to 
support. Does this mean that uneven and combined development is now detached from the 
revolutionary process? Quite the contrary. As I have tried to demonstrate, not only was uneven 
and combined development a universal aspect of capitalist modernity in Trotsky’s own time, 
but it is also an ongoing one which will only cease when the last peasant has been pushed or 
pulled off their land into wage labour and city life. Nuclear holocaust, environmental collapse 
or even the socialist revolution are likely to have occurred long before humanity ever reaches 
that point: it is a process which will never conclude while capitalism subsists. It is rather that 
the connection is no longer with the possibility of revolutions in states which have still to be 
transformed by capital, but is now with those which have not only been so transformed, but 
which are now central the existence of the system.  
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